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Two Distinctions That Help to Chart 
the Interplay Between Conscious  
and Unconscious Volition
Marc Slors*
Section Philosophy of Mind and Language, Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies, Radboud University, 
Nijmegen, Netherlands
Research initiated by Benjamin Libet suggests that short-term conscious intentions are 
not the onsets of bodily actions. However, other research, particularly on longer-term 
intentions, seems to show that at least some conscious intentions are effective. This leads 
to the idea that volition is a complex interplay between conscious and unconscious 
processes. The nature and structure of this interplay is mostly uncharted territory. In this 
article, I will highlight two currently neglected distinctions that will help to chart the territory. 
The first distinction is between intentions we  become conscious of (passive) and 
consciously formed intentions (active). The second is Fred Dretske’s distinction between 
structuring and triggering causes. I will introduce both distinctions by discussing how 
they tie in with and strengthen recent criticism of free selection paradigms and support 
the idea that consciously self-initiated action issues from processes of conscious 
deliberation and/or information integration. I will argue that consciously self-initiated action 
typically involves consciously formed intentions that are the structuring causes of our 
actions. This notion of conscious intentional action allows us to identify at least four stages 
in which unconscious processes co-determine our actions—without undermining their 
self-initiated character.
Keywords: conscious intentions, intentional action, mental causation, conscious agency, volition, self-initiated action
INTRODUCTION
Do conscious intentions cause behavior? There is an impressive literature, based on extensive 
experimental evidence, suggesting that our actions are not, in fact, initiated by conscious intentions 
in the way it is often claimed we  experience this to be  the case (Libet et  al., 1983; Haggard 
and Eimer, 1999; Libet, 1999; Wegner, 2002; Brass and Haggard, 2008; Soon et  al., 2008; Fried 
et  al., 2011). There is a less extensive, but just as interesting literature, also based on solid 
experimentation, however, according to which some conscious intentions are the causes of some 
of our actions (Webb and Sheeran, 2006; Baumeister and Masicampo, 2010; Baumeister et  al., 
2011). Research on implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999) and research on the effects of 
consciously anticipated regret (Janis and Mann, 1977; Tetlock and Boettger, 1994; Richard et  al., 
1996) are cases in point. There need not be  a contradiction between these bodies of literature 
because the experiments cited in both target different kinds of intentions. Roughly speaking, the 
non-efficacious intentions are to be  found in the realm of intentions that occur directly before 
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acting, while the effective ones are often longer-term intentions. 
Thus, those in favor of effective conscious intentions agree that 
“consciousness may be  ill suited for direct control of physical 
behavior” (Baumeister et  al., 2011, p.  352). According to them, 
“conscious causation is often indirect and delayed, and it depends 
on interplay with unconscious processes” (Baumeister et al., 2011, 
p.  331; see also Baumeister and Masicampo, 2010, p.  948).
This more nuanced picture of human motivation as an 
interplay between conscious and non-conscious processes is 
arguably a step forward, compared to the simple affirmation 
or rejection of the efficacy of conscious intentions. Not much 
has been done, however, to fill in this more complex picture 
of human motivation and to chart the ways in which conscious 
and unconscious processes connect and collaborate to produce 
what is known as “self-initiated” action. In this article, I  want 
to make a case for the claim that this is in part due to a 
lack of necessary conceptual distinctions. I  will introduce two 
distinctions pertaining to the main concepts at play–“conscious 
intention” and “causing behavior”–and show how they can help 
to draw a more nuanced picture of human volition.
In order to do this, I  will take what may seem like a 
detour. I  will introduce the two distinctions via relatively 
recent philosophical and scientific criticism of “free selection” 
paradigms–of which Libet’s experiments are the best known 
example–as paradigmatic instances of free will or, more 
neutrally formulated, consciously self-initiated action. This 
discussion will set the stage for a picture of conscious volition 
in which unconscious processes play a crucial part in at 
least four stages of the process of forming an intention and 
acting on it. In a bit more detail, the plan of this article 
is as follows:
In Free Selection Versus Conscious Deliberation, I  will 
discuss existing reservations, both from philosophy and 
from neuroscience, about the relevance of and implicit 
assumptions behind free selection paradigms and the call 
for more research on self-initiated actions conceived of as 
actions that follow from deliberation or complex integration 
of information. Part of this criticism pertains to the 
interpretation of Libet-style experiments as experiments 
about freedom of the will. In the remainder of this article, 
I  will not be  concerned with free will but with consciously 
self-initiated actions only. In Two Kinds of Conscious 
Intention, I will introduce a distinction between (1) intentions 
we  become conscious of and (2) consciously formed. I  will 
argue that this distinction ties in with the call for a shift 
in research focus discussed in Free Selection Versus Conscious 
Deliberation and strengthens it considerably.
In External Influences, Self-Initiation, and Two Types of 
Causation, I  will discuss the extent to which consciously self-
initiated action can involve external cues or causes. Adherents 
of free selection paradigms typically think that this is not the 
case, but their critics think that external cues and causes are 
unavoidable. This raises the question which external cues and 
causes do and which do not undermine the self-initiated 
character of actions. I will argue that Fred Dretske’s distinction 
between triggering and structuring causes helps to answer 
this question.
The upshot of the discussion of these issues will be  that 
the kinds of conscious intentions involved in typical instances 
of consciously self-initiated action are consciously formed 
intentions that are the structuring causes of behavior. In 
The Interplay Between Conscious and Unconscious Processes 
in Consciously Self-Initiated Action, I  will argue that this 
type of conscious volition allows for and often requires 
interplay with unconscious processes at four different stages 
of the unfolding of a willed action–without undermining 
their consciously self-initiated character.
FREE SELECTION VERSUS  
CONSCIOUS DELIBERATION
The 1983 experiment by Benjamin Libet and colleagues is often 
credited as being the start of the experimental, neuro-scientific 
approach to the problem of free will. As is well known, Libet 
found that a conscious intention to lift a finger at any time 
the subject chooses was preceded by an unconscious readiness 
potential (Kornhuber and Deecke, 1965) that is most often 
interpreted as the actual onset of the finger movement (see, 
however, Mele, 2006; Miller et  al., 2011; Schurger et  al., 2012). 
This finding has been replicated several times, not just using 
EEG, but also using fMRI (Soon et  al., 2008) or electrodes in 
the brain (Fried et al., 2011). Moreover, an unconscious readiness 
potential is found to precede and predict not only a “when” 
choice but also a (very limited) “what” choice [do I  press the 
left or the right button? (Haggard and Eimer, 1999)] or even 
a “whether” choice [do I  press a button at all? (Brass and 
Haggard, 2008)]. These experiments have been and still are 
very influential. They play a large role in Daniel Wegner’s more 
“grand scale” attack on the illusion of conscious will (Wegner, 
2002) and persuade many that we  do not have free will (Libet, 
1999). Critique on Libet-style experiments from within 
neuroscience and psychology has focused on methodological 
issues and/or on the trivial or artificial nature of the task of 
finger-lifting as a paradigmatic case for freedom of the will. 
More recent (or better: more recently published) critique pertains 
not so much to the trivial or artificial nature of the choice to 
lift a finger or press a left or right button, but to the groundlessness 
of such choices.
The type of task studied in Libet-style experiments is known 
as a free selection task. The choice a subject has to make–in 
this case: when to lift a finger, or which button to press–is 
typically a spontaneous one, that is, one about which we cannot 
really consciously deliberate. At some point, we  just decide 
to do it. As Markus Schlosser analyzes in detail, this is the 
reason why many philosophers reject the idea that Libet-style 
experiments are about free will (Schlosser, 2014). It is “widely 
agreed within the philosophical debate that questions concerning 
free will are, first and foremost, questions concerning choices 
and actions that are based on reasons. On most views, this 
does not mean that the relevant choices and actions must 
be  based on conscious deliberation about pros and cons, and 
it does not mean that they must be  based on normatively 
good reasons. Rather, to say that the relevant choices and 
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actions are based on reasons means, more modestly, that they 
can be  rationalized from the agent’s point of view (…)” 
(Schlosser, 2014, p.  250). This does not mean that “being 
based on reasons” is generally considered to be  sufficient for 
an action to be  free. Many philosophers consider the 
indeterminacy of the outcome of choices to play an equally 
important role. Schlosser’s point, however, is that while Libet-
style experiments highlight the indeterminacy of choice outcome, 
many philosophers interested in free will ignore Libet because 
free selection tasks do not involve acting for a reason, which 
they consider to be  a necessary condition for free will. The 
complaint that Libet does not address real free will cannot 
be  found in print often (see, however, Dennett, 1991; Mecacci 
and Haselager, 2015; Asma, 2019). But the rather minimal 
effect that Libet-style experiments have had on the rich, lively 
and generally well-informed philosophical debate on free will 
is a form of criticism in itself.
The kind of freedom that is associated with free selection 
tasks is usually referred to as “liberty of indifference” in 
philosophy, not “free will.” According to Schlosser, this does 
not mean that free selection tasks do not target a specific 
kind of freedom. They do. The point is rather that this kind 
of freedom is “insignificant and uninteresting” (Schlosser, 2014, 
p.  251). Choices that are not based on reasons, i.e., choices 
that are not grounded in the fact that some feature, consequence, 
or aspect of the action is “wanted, desired, prized, held dear, 
thought dutiful, beneficial, obligatory or agreeable” (Davidson, 
1963, p.  685) by the agent, are not worth worrying about. 
This is why Schlosser concludes that research on, e.g., decision 
making provides us with much more valuable materials to 
think about free will.
At this point, however, we  could distinguish between the 
practical concerns of people that philosophers are interested 
in and the theoretical concerns of scientists. Some scientists 
are interested in the question whether conscious intentions 
initiate actions. It would avoid confusion and unnecessary 
polemics when we  say that Libet’s research shows that in 
his experiments there is no “consciously self-initiated action” 
(despite a phenomenology that seems to tell us otherwise), 
rather than no “free will.” This description would also fit 
the purpose of the present paper better. And yet, this 
terminological change does not mean that free selection 
advocates are off the hook.
Friederike Schüur and Patrick Haggard identify a problem 
for free selection tasks as a typical model for self-initiated 
actions (Schüür and Haggard, 2011). First, they distinguish 
self-initiated actions in free selection paradigms from other 
types of self-initiated action found in the literature. In many 
psychological studies, self-initiated actions are taken to be operant 
actions that are not triggered by immediate external cues but 
by internal cues, such as a subject’s own preceding actions, 
elapsed time, or (changed) behavioral goals. Typically, these 
internal triggers can be  manipulated and controlled in 
psychological experiments. This is what they refer to as type 
I  self-initiated action. Free selection experiments target what 
they call type II self-initiated actions. Like type I  self-initiated 
actions, these are not triggered by external cues. But unlike 
tasks that elicit type I actions, free selection tasks are deliberately 
designed such that no internal cues can play a role either. 
The point is, again, that subjects have no specific preferences 
about when to lift a finger or about pressing a right or a left 
button and that they cannot really deliberate about this–there 
are no reasons for pressing left or right or lifting a finger now 
rather than later. At some point, subjects just become conscious 
of the fact that they have an intention to act. In this sense, 
type II self-initiated actions are “underdetermined.”
And yet, such actions have to be  determined by something. 
The implicit assumption in the concept of type II self-initiated 
actions, Schüür and Haggard analyze, is that rather than triggered 
by internal or external cues, such actions are thought to 
be  issued by what they call an “agential self.” Like Wegner 
and others, they consider this notion to be  derived from 
subjective experience; we  experience ourselves (our conscious 
selves) to be  the authors of our actions. And just like Wegner, 
they argue that such experience is a poor guide for science. 
The very notion of an agential self, they argue, is problematic 
for several reasons. Unanswered scientific questions–What is 
it? How does it cause behavior? How can it be  manipulated 
in experiments (and if it can be  manipulated, do such 
manipulations not simply count as internal cues)?–are among 
the less profound ones. The really deep problem is that the 
agential self plays the role of an Aristotelean “prime mover 
unmoved,” or an entity that can initiate actions “spontaneously” 
(Brembs, 2010). Like the familiar homunculus fallacy, this just 
defers explanation of the origin of actions or at best invites 
an infinite regress.
Type I self-initiated actions do not exhaust all self-initiated 
actions, then, but type II is problematic. This is why Schüür 
and Haggard (2011), p. 1,702 propose a type III self-initiated 
action, which they define as “the motor consequences of 
processing and integrating large numbers of qualitatively 
different types of input”. This “complex integration” may 
look like an odd definition for self-generated action. The 
authors themselves even characterize it as less than fully 
intuitive. But they might not be  doing justice to their own 
proposal. They way in which subjects integrate complex 
information–i.e., information from different times, locations 
about different objects and attributes–is sufficiently biography- 
and character-dependent to yield different, idiosyncratic, 
personalized responses from different people to the same 
inputs to count as “self-initiated.” The good move that is 
made here is that instead of conceiving self-generated actions 
as “underdetermined,” or “spontaneous,” they are conceived 
of as being determined by a complex of factors the integration 
of which is highly personal–arguably, this integration is the 
personal, “self ”-factor. This “self,” however, is not an 
Aristotelian unmoved mover, but something that is present 
in the idiosyncratic–or authentic, if you  will–nature of a 
person’s responses to immediate cues, internal and external.
To study self-initiated action that is not operant, then, 
we  should not rely on free selection paradigms, but rather 
look at studies on, for instance, decision making. Schüür 
and Haggard (2011), p.  1,702 claim that studies in decision 
making such as these are conducted in economics target a 
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specific sub-set of type III self-initiated actions. But they do 
emphasize that such studies use normative models–models 
about the most appropriate or correct way of responding–that 
certainly do not apply in all instances of type III self-initiated 
action. What is striking, though, is that Schüür and Haggard’s 
conclusion about how to study self-initiated action and how 
not resembles Schlosser’s conclusion about how to study free 
will. Rather than looking at free selection tasks, all agree 
that we  should look at the processes through which people 
come to their actions summarized under the headings of 
“deliberation” and “complex integration.” Such processes cover 
not only decision making, but also more associative or 
emotional processes of weighing options and less transparent, 
unconscious processes in which diverse inputs are integrated 
to yield specific behavior.
Here it might seem as if we  are losing sight of the role 
of consciousness in the production of actions. To some extent 
that is true. Since we  are concerned in this article with the 
role of consciousness in the production of actions, let us limit 
our attention to the subset of conscious processes that underlie 
acting for reasons and complex integration. With respect to 
consciously self-initiated actions, then, the upshot of the 
discussion of Schlosser and Schüür and Haggard is that a case 
can be  made for the claim that free selection tasks will largely 
be uninformative; if we want to study consciously self-initiated 
action, we  should concentrate on conscious decision making, 
conscious deliberation, and other forms of conscious integration 
of diverse inputs.
This is not to say that this case is decisive; our discussion 
so far is too brief for that. In the next section, however, I want 
to strengthen the criticism of free selection paradigms and 
the call for research on deliberation and decision making by 
means of a commonsensical but essential distinction between 
two types of conscious intention.
TWO KINDS OF CONSCIOUS 
INTENTION
Let me start by introducing, discussing, and defending a 
distinction between two types of conscious intention. I  will 
then tie this distinction into the discussion on free selection 
versus conscious deliberation/complex integration and argue 
that it augments and boosts the case against free selection 
and for conscious deliberation/complex integration as a paradigm 
for consciously self-initiated action.
In most of the literature, distinctions between kinds of 
intentions are limited to temporal distinctions–between long-
term or distal intentions, short-term or proximal intentions and 
motor intentions–or, rarely, differences pertaining to their initiating 
or monitoring function (Searle, 1983; Brand, 1984; Mele, 1992; 
Pacherie, 2006). Apart from such temporal/functional differences, 
conscious intentions, as such, are treated as a more or less 
homogeneous group. This might be due to the association between 
consciousness and the self (inherited from Descartes). Intentions 
that are conscious are treated, implicitly or explicitly, as 
intentions that subjects most clearly consider to be  their own. 
If so, being consciously entertained is a crucially important 
characterizing feature of intentions. In fact, the association 
between self and consciousness is what Libet-style experiments 
implicitly draw on when interpreted as arguments against free 
will. If we  define free will as involving agential control over 
actions, the argument goes as follows: (1) conscious intentions 
are my intentions, (2) conscious intentions do not control my 
actions, at best they go along for a ride that is determined by 
unconscious processes, ergo: (3) I do not control my actions. 
This style of thinking makes being consciously entertained a 
cardinally important feature of intentions. Thus, it seems natural 
to treat conscious intentions as one particular class of intentions; 
further distinctions within that class would not pertain to the 
fact or the way in which they are conscious.
This, I  claim, is a mistake. They way in which intentions are 
conscious and/or the role of consciousness vis-a-vis their formation 
can be  so different that it makes sense to distinguish between 
at least two different types of conscious intention. It seems 
perfectly commonsensical to distinguish between intentions 
we  become or are conscious of on the one hand, and intentions 
that are consciously formed on the other. This is the functional 
difference between passively registering an intention versus actively 
producing one. It is likely that the kinds of consciousness involved 
in these different types are not the same–passively registering 
probably involves a kind of perceptual or phenomenal consciousness, 
whereas active formation requires reflective consciousness (Roessler 
and Eilan, 2003)–but I  will not pursue this point here. Instead, 
I  will concentrate on the functional difference.
Consciously registered intentions are those intentions that 
we  become aware of while not being aware of the process 
leading up to them. To say that they are passively registered 
does not mean that these intentions just pop up; it is to say 
that consciousness is passive or perceptive relative to these 
intentions and that their active production is unconscious. They 
can be  intentions we  register only after we  have started to act 
on them, like in Searle’s “intentions in action” (Searle, 1983). 
But awareness of a passively registered intention can also precede 
action. Suppose you  are going to get ice cream, but it is only 
at the moment that the shopkeeper asks what flavor you would 
like that you  realize that you  are craving banana ice cream. 
At that moment, you become aware of–you consciously register–
an intention to buy banana ice cream, which in turn determines 
your order. Intentions we  consciously register, passively, are 
probably a more common phenomenon than the classic Cartesian 
image of consciously controlled action suggests.
Here a problem might seem to arise. Intentions are executive 
states. Mele (2006, 2009) has argued that in Libet-style 
experiments we  do not become conscious of such executive 
states, but merely of an urge to act. This urge is then either 
given a conscious nod of approval–an avowal–and turned into 
an intention or it is vetoed. This proposal would give 
consciousness an active role in producing intentions that I argue 
are merely passively registered.1 The problem with Mele’s move, 
however, is that it requires a causal link between a conscious 
intention as an executive state and an action. While Libet 
1 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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allows for such a causal link, other researchers, most notable 
Daniel Wegner (2002), have argued that actions that follow a 
conscious intention are in fact caused by unconscious processes 
associated with the unconscious causes of the intention, thus 
severing the causal link between a conscious intention and 
the ensuing action. For this reason, I  would favor a notion 
of the required avowal that is less vulnerable to criticism. A 
plausible candidate would be  to say that an avowal consists 
in being prepared and able to explain and defend acting on 
an intention when questioned. This allows for the possibility 
of intentions we  passively become conscious of, as executive 
states. Suppose you  are looking for a new place to live and 
have narrowed your choice down to three houses you  have 
seen. You  tell yourself that you  need to sleep over it because 
this kind of decision should not be  taken in a few minutes. 
At some point, however, you  can just notice that you  have 
already settled on a particular house. Or suppose you  are 
doubting whether to buy that new car. At some point, you may 
just notice that your nagging doubt is a signal of the fact 
that you  decided it is too expensive and you  should not buy 
it. This notion of avowing can acknowledge the intuition Mele 
builds on, that is, the intuition that we  sometimes consciously 
turn an urge into an intention. The point is, though, that it 
would remain a possibility that the conscious avowal is an 
ineffective consequence of an effective unconscious avowal.
Actively, consciously produced intentions, by contrast, involve 
conscious activity that brings intentions into existence. 
Consciously bringing about an intention is not some magical 
process through which an intention pops up out of nothing 
through some conscious “oomph” (to use Wegner’s evocative 
term). Rather, it involves pondering, weighing of options, 
decision making, thinking, or generally put, making up one’s 
mind. Think of forming the intention to have your next vacation 
in France. This is in all likelihood a conscious process in 
which you  gather information about destinations, preferences 
of family members, etc. and then decide based on weighing 
various factors. Or think of deciding what to pick from a 
restaurant menu. What makes it plausible that consciousness 
is indeed a necessary part of the formation of such intentions 
is the fact that their formation requires information that is 
consciously accessed. Gathering information about holiday 
destinations or being aware of the various options on a restaurant 
menu are integral parts of the process of forming an intention, 
parts without which the intention could not be  formed.
To say that consciously gathering information, consciously 
probing ones preferences, consciously weighing pros and cons, 
etc. are necessary for the formation of some intentions is not 
to say that it is sufficient or that every aspect of the process 
of the formation of such intentions is conscious.2 Many decision 
processes are such that consciously tallying pros and cons, for 
instance, will not deliver a decisive answer on what to do. 
Our choices are not fully determined by our conscious beliefs 
and desires (for if they are, they would not be  choices, but 
simply action intentions that logically follow from and are 
hence given by our beliefs and desires). What, then, tips the 
2 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pressing me on this.
balance in favor of a specific choice? Holton (2009, pp.  53–69) 
has argued that unconscious preferences and processes attract 
us to one of the options we  can choose from, even though 
at a conscious level all options might seem equally defensible. 
This view seems to have both the science of motivation and 
the phenomenology of choosing on its side (see also The 
Interplay Between Conscious and Unconscious Processes in 
Consciously Self-Initiated Action). So, it is not the actual 
formation of intentions unconscious after all? I  would argue 
that this would be  a misleading conclusion. For even when 
unconscious preferences and processes do play an essential 
role in forming an intention, the crucial difference between 
intentions we  become conscious of and consciously formed 
intentions is that in the latter case consciousness plays an 
ineliminable role–these intentions could not have been produced 
without the essential contribution of consciousness.
Consciousness can provide what Vierkant (2018), following 
Hieronymi (2009), calls “managerial control” of deliberation 
processes leading up to a choice/intention formation. That is, 
control aimed at facilitating and enabling the process of intention 
formation, even when part of that process is unconscious. 
Conscious intentions to choose–that is, intentions to form an 
intention–can initiate a process of deliberation, for instance 
(see Wu, 2013). But conscious intentional processes play a role 
too in terminating deliberation. Shepherd, for instance, argues 
“direct control over decisions is an extension of the skilled 
mental activity of deliberation, necessarily involves attention, 
and is initiated in response to attention-mediated indication 
that terminating deliberation by forming some intention is 
appropriate (Shepherd, 2014, pp. 349–350). Furthermore, Vierkant 
(2018, p.  7) argues that refraining from reopening deliberation 
after forming an intention that is co-caused by unconscious 
preferences is also part of the managerial control of deliberation. 
There is a fourth function of consciousness that makes it a 
necessary part of some processes leading up to intention-
formation and that may also count as contributing to managerial 
control. One of the most widely accepted features of consciousness 
in the neuro-scientific literature is that it “has been seen by 
almost all theorists as helping to integrate information” 
(Baumeister and Masicampo, 2010, p.  949). Morsella refers to 
a much longer list of theories on the function of consciousness 
when he speaks of “the integration consensus.” The idea behind 
this consensus is that conscious processes “integrate neural 
activities and information processing structures that would 
otherwise be  independent (…). Many of these theories speak 
of a central information exchange, where dominant information 
is distributed globally” (Morsella, 2005, pp.  1001–1002). This 
is exactly what is required when one is consciously making 
up one’s mind. Integration, in a metaphor, comes down to 
being able to “lay all options on the table,” so that we  can 
compare, deliberate, and finally decide and form an intention.
Despite these different types of conscious managerial control 
over processes of deliberation, it may well be  that ultimately 
an unconscious preference tilts the balance and determines 
the formation of an intention, as Holton argues. But this does 
not make the intention an unconsciously produced one. For 
without the conscious initiation of the deliberation process, 
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consciously laying all options on the table, and the consciously 
initiated and maintained termination of deliberation by reaching 
a decision, these unconscious preferences would not have given 
rise to intention-formation.
Now that the distinction between intentions we  become 
conscious of and intentions we  consciously form is in place, 
we  can return to the discussion of the previous section. The 
first thing to note is that the picture of consciously formed 
intentions in terms of the information-integrating function of 
consciousness lines up perfectly with Schüür and Haggard’s 
views on self-initiated action as requiring what they call “complex 
integration.” It also fits with the philosophical consensus 
highlighted by Schlosser that we  should focus on intentions 
that are the product of reasons (although Schlosser does argue 
that not all such reasons need not be  the product of conscious 
deliberation). The terminology in these three areas of the 
literature–on the function of consciousness, on the neuroscience 
of self-initiated actions, and on the science and philosophy of 
free will–is slightly different, but the ideas seem to overlap. 
Thus, I  take the plea for more research on conscious decision 
making, complex integration, and conscious deliberation 
discussed in the previous section as a plea for the idea that 
paradigmatic instances of consciously self-initiated action are 
cases of the active conscious formation of an intention to act.
Second, and at least as importantly, the distinction between 
the two types of conscious intention allows us to better articulate 
the problem with free selection paradigms. For Schlosser, the 
main problem is that choices made in such paradigms are 
uninteresting because they do not involve reasons and 
deliberation. Schüür and Haggard see another problem, namely 
the implicit appeal to an “agential self ” that appears to function 
somewhat like an unmoved mover. Both observations can 
be combined in a single complaint when we use the conceptual 
distinction between the two types of conscious intention. The 
combined complaint runs as follows:
Free selection paradigms are presented as if they might allow 
for the conscious formation of intentions, in which case the 
unconscious initiation of actions that is actually found in such 
experiments would be a strike against our self-image as conscious 
agents. If free selection tasks might involve actively consciously 
formed intentions, however, then there has to be  a conscious 
process by means of which this intention is produced. This 
process cannot be a process of deliberation or complex integration. 
There is nothing to deliberate about–there are no reasons for 
lifting a finger now or later. The implicit idea at play, then, 
is that there is some conscious “oomph” that can produce 
intentions just like that. This is what Schüür and Haggard 
refer to as the idea of an “agential self ” that is based on our 
subjective experience of ourselves. Allegedly, we  experience 
ourselves as consciously producing an intention in free selection 
tasks. But this is the mistake made by Libet and his followers: 
the fact that we  do not experience the process leading up to 
a conscious intention does not mean that we experience ourselves 
producing it spontaneously (at best we can–mistakenly–interpret 
ourselves that way). All we experience is an intention “popping 
up” in consciousness.
If we  stick to the distinction between the two types of 
conscious intention introduced in this section, we  would have 
to conclude that intentions in free selection tasks are in fact 
intentions that subjects simply become conscious of–passively. 
The intention to lift a finger in Libet’s experiment is like the 
intention to order banana ice cream that just pops up when 
we  are asked what flavor we  prefer. For such intentions, there 
is no preceding conscious process of deliberation. Yet, as Schüür 
and Haggard argue, they would have to come from somewhere. 
Intentions that we  passively become conscious of have to 
be  formed, by their very nature, “outside” of consciousness. 
Therefore, free selection tasks, choosing without being able to 
deliberate, must involve intentions that are formed unconsciously. 
Thus, Libet et  al.’s findings should not have been a surprise. 
More importantly, free selection paradigms should not count 
as targeting consciously self-initiated action in the first place.
The upshot of the discussion of Free Selection Versus 
Conscious Deliberation and Free Selection Versus Conscious 
Deliberation, then, is that when it comes to consciously self-
initiated action, intentions formed through conscious deliberation 
or conscious integration are the only relevant ones. This is 
what I will take as point of departure for the rest of this article.
EXTERNAL INFLUENCES,  
SELF-INITIATION, AND TWO  
TYPES OF CAUSATION
One of the more central differences between intentions that 
are consciously formed through deliberation, or more generally, 
through “complex integration” of diverse inputs on the one 
hand, and the kind of “spontaneously formed” conscious 
intentions that Libet implicitly supposed are at play in free 
selection tasks, is that the latter, but not the former, are 
supposed to be  completely free of influences that originate 
from outside the acting subject. According to Schlosser, Libet 
holds that “free choices have exclusively internal causes, and 
free choices are thereby contrasted, implicitly, with choices 
that are influenced by external factors” (Schlosser, 2014, p. 253). 
Schüür and Haggard agree, at least partially. Like Schlosser, 
they believe that Libet wants to exclude external causes from 
self-initiated actions. Unlike Schlosser, however, as outlined 
in Free Selection Versus Conscious Deliberation, they believe 
Libet wanted to exclude internal causes and cues just as well 
in favor of an “agential self ” as the sole source of action: 
“The reasoning underlying free selection paradigms seems to 
be  that if the degree of self-generatedness of an action is 
defined by the absence of specification by inputs, then free 
selection paradigms allow the study of self-generated actions 
in their ‘purest’ form” (Schüür and Haggard, 2011, p.  1,699). 
It is not entirely clear whether there is real disagreement here 
over the role of internal causes in Libet’s notion of free choice, 
as choices that are (putatively) caused by an agential self might 
also be  thought of as internally caused. Be  this as it may, 
my concern in this section is with external factors that influence 
self-initiated actions.
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In their opposition to the idea that free selection is 
paradigmatic for self-initiated action, Schüür and Haggard 
explicitly state that self-initiated actions can and do involve 
external influences (see also Nachev and Husain, 2010; Ohbi, 
2012). According to the “complex integration” account of self-
initiated action, “one can correctly claim to have authored an 
action even if it was guided or influenced by external inputs. 
Whether or not one knows about this influence of external 
inputs, or whether or not one can verbalize it, does not affect 
whether an action is self-generated” (Schüür and Haggard, 
2011, p.  1,703). The reasoning here is straightforward: internal 
action-generating factors are bound to be  affected by external 
inputs that follow from an agent’s interactions with the world; 
if we think this affects the self-initiated character of the actions 
that follow from internal causes, then we imply that self-initiated 
action must issue from some causally insulated part of ourselves 
(an “agential self ”) that does not exist.
Likewise, Schlosser argues that in reason explanations the 
distinction between internal and external factors determining 
behavior is problematic. He refers to Betram Malle who compares 
what seems to be a situation-based explanation involving external 
determining factors–“Jack bought the house because it was 
secluded”–with an explanation involving internal causes–“Jill 
bought the house because she wanted privacy” (Malle, 2011; 
the examples are derived from Ross, 1977). Despite linguistic 
appearances, these explanations are not radically different. 
Malle’s point is not that we  cannot distinguish internal from 
external factors; rather, it is that the first explanation merely 
seems to be  a situational one. In fact, it is referring to internal 
factors because it is Jack’s belief that the house is secluded 
that motivated him to buy it. Still, beliefs, as factors that 
co-determine our choices are themselves co-constituted by our 
interactions with the world. These interactions are not part 
of the reasons for which we  act, but they can nevertheless 
contribute to action explanation as part of the “causal history 
of reasons” (Malle, 2011, p.  317). Hence, “choosing and acting 
on the basis of reasons involves, typically, both internal and 
external factors” (Schlosser, 2014, p.  253).
These lines of reasoning, sound as they are, do not imply 
that any external factor can determine our actions without 
affecting the degree to which it is self-initiated. Coercion and 
manipulation, conscious or unconscious, clearly count as external 
action-determining factors, and they clearly undermine the 
self-initiated character of actions. The question, then, is where 
to draw the line; when do external influences undermine the 
self-initiated character of action? This is a tough question that 
Schlosser, Schüür, and Haggard avoid and that I will not attempt 
to answer fully. But there is a less tough question that Schüür, 
Haggard, and Schlosser avoid as well and that can be answered: 
what are the typical external influences involved in actions 
that we  tend to characterize as self-initiated?
One part of the answer to this question is implied by the 
foregoing discussion: consciously self-initiated actions are issued 
by conscious deliberation or other forms of “complex integration,” 
but these processes themselves are operations on a diverse 
range of inputs, many, most, or perhaps all of which might 
have external origins. Belief formation is a clear case in point. 
But even formation of desires and preferences may be  the 
result of subliminal priming (Schüür and Haggard, 2011, 
p. 1,703) or other external influences. These external influences 
do not undermine the self-initiated character of actions if or 
when they do not pre-program the outcomes of the process 
of complex integration and/or deliberation.
But there is another type of external influence. Sometimes 
external events seem to give rise to behavioral responses more 
or less immediately–think of my stopping automatically when 
a traffic light turns yellow. In such cases, it is unlikely that 
much conscious reflection occurs in between the trigger and 
the action. So, do such external triggers undermine the self-
initiated character of my action? In the remainder of this 
section I will argue that with the notion of self-initiated action 
as action that follows from conscious deliberation/integration 
in hand, it is quite easy to distinguish between direct external 
triggers that are and those that are not compatible with 
consciously self-initiated action. The trick is to look at the 
way in which intentions that are the product of deliberation 
or integration are supposed to cause our actions.
In much of the literature on the causal (in)efficacy of 
intentions, causal relations are depicted as what Fred Dretske 
calls “triggering causes” (Dretske, 1988). This is not to say 
that all intentions immediately trigger actions. Most of our 
intentions are not aimed at actions right here and now but 
at actions that have to occur sometime in the future. Intentions 
to take the 6 o’ clock train, to have pasta for diner, to finish 
a paper in the upcoming week, to have a coffee in the next 
break, etc. are cases in point. In jargon, these are longer-term, 
distal, or future-directed intentions, to be  distinguished from 
short-term, proximal, present-directed intentions (these are all 
relative notions, to be  sure–a distal intention can be  aimed 
at the next 5  min as well as at years from now). A distal 
intention is the onset of a causal “cascade” (Pacherie, 2006, 
2008) of internal processes that eventually leads to an action: 
a distal intention will at some point in time, when the relevant 
circumstances to act arrive, transform into a proximal intention, 
which will in turn transform in the actual motor intentions 
that cause the appropriate bodily movements. Elisabeth Pacherie 
calls the process in which a distal intention is transformed 
into proximal and motor intentions “situational anchoring.”
How should we  conceive of the process in between the 
formation of a distal intention and its situational anchoring? 
Suppose that I  consciously decide that from now on I  will 
respond to yellow traffic lights by stepping on my brake rather 
than on the gas (prompted, say, by a particularly expensive 
traffic fine). It is extremely unlikely that there is a causal chain 
of neural events, one triggering the other, in between my 
forming this intention and my acting on it. Perhaps there 
may be some active monitoring of the environment to determine 
whether the right circumstance to act occur, say whenever 
we  are behind the steering wheel. But even then, the actual 
“triggering” effect of the intention to stop for yellow traffic 
lights is temporarily put on hold. Rather than conceiving of 
distal intentions as the triggering causes of our actions, it is 
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much more plausible to conceive of them as what Dretske 
called “structuring causes.”3
The idea of a structuring cause is most easily explained by 
reference to an electric circuit: suppose that flipping a switch 
causes the light bulb to burn. Flipping the switch would then 
be  the triggering cause. But it can only trigger the light to go 
on given that someone wired the switch and the light bulb to 
a power source in the appropriate way. This wiring is the 
structuring cause of the light bulb burning. The direct effect of 
this particular structuring cause is that a disposition–an if-then 
relation–is put in place: after the structuring cause, but not 
before, flipping the switch will cause the light to go on. My 
forming the intention to stop at yellow traffic lights from now 
on functions as a structuring cause. I set myself up–if my intention 
is indeed efficacious–to respond to external triggers (yellow traffic 
lights) in a specific way, immediately and quite possibly without 
thinking. The direct effect of my intention is not breaking but 
a disposition to break in response to seeing a yellow traffic light.
The idea of distal intentions as structuring, rather than 
triggering causes of action, explains how some direct external 
triggers of actions do not undermine the self-initiated character 
of actions. Even though I  will respond automatically and 
unconsciously to a yellow traffic light, this can be  an effect of 
a distal intention that has predisposed me to respond in this 
way. If the distal intention and hence the predisposition are 
the result of a process of conscious deliberation, then my stopping 
for a yellow traffic light may be a consciously self-initiated action, 
even though it is an unconscious response to an external trigger.
It is tempting to apply a similar structure to finger lifting 
or button pressing in Libet-style free selection tasks. As has 
been argued by many, starting with Dennett (1991), the efficacious 
intention of subjects in these experiments is not the proximal 
intention to lift a finger now, but the distal intention that is 
formed when subjects agree to lift their finger at their chosen 
time while keeping their eye on a clock or some other device 
in order to record the time of the conscious proximal intention. 
In all likelihood, the processing of the instructions for these 
experiments is conscious processes of information integration 
resulting in the active formation of an intention. The direct 
effect of the formation of this intention is a disposition to 
respond not to external triggers, but to internal ones (Asma, 
2018, pp.  87–88). These internal triggers may, for instance, 
be the result of ongoing, unconscious, spontaneous fluctuations 
in neural activity (Schurger et  al., 2012).
The emphasis on consciously formed distal intentions as 
the structuring causes of actions in this section is not meant 
to rule out the possibility that consciously formed proximal 
intentions can function as the direct triggers of action (Asma, 
2018, pp.  87–89). This possibility might be  controversial in 
light of the evidence against conscious proximal intentions as 
3 Wu (2011) uses this notion in a similar way in a slightly different context. 
I have defended it earlier (Slors, 2015) in connection with Libet, Wegner, 
and other neuroscientific attacks on the conscious will. Pacherie (2015) 
agrees that the notion of structuring causes is a fruitful one in the context 
of conscious agency and refers to both publications. I am not aware of 
other uses of this concept in this context. Given its intuitive plausibility 
and usefulness in this context, it is not unlikely that I am missing references.
initiators of actions, though (then again, most of this evidence 
is based on research that, like Libet-style experiments, involves 
intentions subjects become passively aware of rather than 
actively formed intentions). Including the possibility of actively 
formed proximal intentions as the direct triggering causes of 
actions would not, however, alter the conclusions about the 
interplay of conscious and unconscious processes that I  will 
outline in the next section. For that reason, I  will not discuss 
this possibility further.
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN CONSCIOUS 
AND UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSES IN 
CONSCIOUSLY SELF-INITIATED ACTION
The upshot of our discussion so far is that consciously self-
initiated actions are (1) caused by actively consciously formed 
intentions, not by intentions we  passively become conscious of. 
(2) Though it is not impossible that some of these intentions 
are the triggering causes of our actions, many of them function 
as the structuring causes of actions by setting us up to become 
responsive to external and internal triggers. This type of human 
volition–consciously formed intentions as the structuring causes 
of actions–involves at least four stages in the process that 
starts with the formation of an intention and ends with the 
intended action in which unconscious processes play a constitutive 
part, without reducing the consciously self-initiated character 
of these actions. I  will list and briefly discuss these stages in 
this section.
But not before reiterating what it is that makes an action 
consciously self-initiated on the current proposal. From the 
above discussion, one clear condition can be distilled that have 
to be  met for this to be  the case:
 1. Conscious deliberation and/or conscious integration of 
complex information has to play a non-redundant part in 
the production of the intention.
To speak meaningfully of self-initiated action, it might 
be  appropriate to add a second condition. Intentions that are 
not person-specific while they are, in part, produced by conscious 
deliberation may nevertheless not be  paradigmatic instances 
of self-initiated action if everyone arrives at the same decision. 
Think of travelers who read and process timetables for public 
transport in order to reach a decision about which train to 
catch. Such decisions may count as self-initiated in the literal 
sense that each person decides for herself. But on a “thicker” 
reading of “self,” according to which a self is characterized by 
what is distinctive of a person, the following condition may 
be  added:
 2. The outcome of this conscious process has to be  person-
specific–e.g., determined by a person’s biography, socialization, 
and/or genetic make-up–to such an extent that different 
people would form different, person-specific, intentions even 
when the inputs for their processes of intention formation 
are similar or identical.
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This second condition is optional in the sense that it is not 
crucial for the rest of my argument.
These requirements for consciously self-initiated action pertain 
to the process of actual intention-formation only. Within the 
overall process that begins just before the intention is formed 
and ends when the intention is acted upon, this leaves four 
stages that might involve unconscious processes, three of which 
have been mentioned already in the previous section. Let me 
discuss these stages in chronological order, that is, in the order 
in which the process from forming an intention to acting on 
it unfolds. I  will be  brief about the stages that I  have already 
discussed in the previous sections.
Stage 1: The Inputs of Conscious 
Deliberation and/or Information 
Integration
Deliberation starts from specific beliefs, desires, preferences, 
etc. Information integration starts with the various bits of 
information, from memory, perception, thought, etc. that are 
going to be  integrated. Many (most?) of these inputs have 
unconscious, sometimes external, origins. Desires, preferences, 
inclinations, yearnings, cravings, longings, etc. are usual things 
we  become conscious of –passively. Like the examples of one’s 
preference for banana ice cream or the urge to move a finger 
in Libet’s experiments, such attitudes can be consciously picked 
up on, but they are usually not produced by conscious reflection. 
We  find ourselves endowed with them. And yet, they play a 
crucial part in practical deliberations. The same goes for other 
types of inputs. Memories, perceptions, even some beliefs 
we  have without being aware of their causal origins can all 
function as inputs for processes of integration/deliberation. But 
while they are being consciously picked up on, they are not 
the products of the processes of deliberation/integration they 
function as inputs for.
Stage 2: Deliberation and/or Integration 
Resulting in the Formation of an Intention
This stage has not been discussed in the foregoing, and it 
may seem odd to list the one stage in which consciousness 
plays its essential role among the stages in which unconscious 
processes play a role as well. So let me discuss this stage in 
a bit more length than the others. This point is this: while 
(reflective) consciousness may be  required to set a process of 
deliberation and/or information integration in motion, for 
instance, by processing the instructions of an experiment by 
subjects, or by “laying all options on the table” (see the previous 
section), the very processes of judging, weighing, or concluding 
need not be  as fully conscious as many or most of us are 
inclined to think. I do not have the space (nor the argumentative 
materials) to argue conclusively for the unconscious nature of 
some processes of judging or concluding here. All I  can do 
is cite some–very old–surprising experimental results that seem 
to suggest that some of the processes we  think are conscious 
are in fact unconscious, thus making the overall second stage 
of “consciously forming an intention” a combination of conscious 
and unconscious processes.
The experimental results I  have in mind are antique results 
from the time of introspectionist psychology. A first experiment 
worth mentioning was aimed at investigating the phenomenology 
of making very simple conscious judgments (Marbe, 1901/2012). 
Subjects had to lift two small weights and judge which one 
was heavier than the other. These highly trained subjects 
provided meticulous descriptions of the bodily sensations while 
touching and lifting the weights, but contrary to their own 
expectations, they found that the very act of judgment itself 
was not conscious. They were conscious of feeling the weights, 
lifting them, and of concluding that one was heavier than the 
other, but the very process by means of which this conclusion 
was reached was not consciously accessible. Or, at least, so it 
seemed. Because this finding was counter-intuitive and ad hoc 
hypothesis was formed: the process of judging is conscious 
but it happens so fast that it is missed by subjects.
In order to test this hypothesis, another experiment was 
set up (Watt, 1905/2011). In this experiment, subjects were 
shown words in response to which they had to utter an 
associated word quickly. This was not free association, but 
partially constrained association: subjects had to associate a 
word that was, for instance, superordinate to the shown word 
(e.g., wolf-animal), coordinate (wolf-lion), or subordinate (wolf-
leg) (there were other options too). The experiments were 
“broken down” in four phases: (1) receiving the instructions 
(e.g., utter a coordinate association), (2) the presentation of 
the stimulus word, (3) searching for an appropriate association, 
and finally (4) uttering this association. Subjects were asked 
to concentrate specifically on one of these phases. It was 
expected that the third phase would consist of a conscious 
process of searching for an association–just like it was expected 
that Marbe’s subjects would experience a conscious process of 
judging. When subjects had to focus on this third phase it 
was expected that even though it would be  a fast process–like 
the others–subjects would report their conscious experience 
of it. In fact, however, phase three was “blank.” There was no 
conscious experience of searching and finding an association. 
As it turned out, the associations just popped up in consciousness.
This information is anecdotal, and the actual findings would 
perhaps not count as scientific by today’s standards. And yet 
they should make us open to the possibility that parts of what 
we  think of as conscious processes of integrating information or 
deliberating so as to form an intention to act are as not conscious, 
despite the fact that many of us have intuitions to the contrary.
Two further stages in which unconscious processing plays 
a role in the overall process from forming an intention to 
acting on it. These stages occur only when conscious intentions 
function as the structuring causes of actions (hence, they are 
irrelevant in cases where consciously formed intention directly 
triggers our actions, should these exist). The direct effect of 
intentions as structuring causes of actions is the formation of 
a behavioral disposition. The examples used in the previous 
section–automatically hitting the break when seeing a yellow 
traffic light, and a subject in Libet’s finger lifting experiment 
consciously taking in the experiment’s instructions–are cases 
in point. In these examples, the behavioral dispositions are 
relatively simple. But they can be  more complex too. For 
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example, I  consciously decided to have lunch in the canteen 
at 12.30 today, thus disposing myself to respond to seeing the 
clock indicate 12.25 by following a complex route to the canteen, 
queueing for an elevator, taking the proper turns, etc., i.e., 
responding to the very many different relevant visual cues in 
appropriate ways, without giving it much thought (this is an 
example of an implementation intention, mentioned in the 
introduction; Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer and Sheeran, 2006). 
After forming a behavioral disposition, there are two stages 
that may involve unconscious processing. Let me briefly say 
something about both.
Stage 3: Maintenance of a  
Behavioral Disposition
In between forming a disposition and acting on it, a disposition 
has to be  maintained. In many cases, this does not require 
much cognitive effort. But in some cases, a disposition is 
maintained only because some background monitoring takes 
place. My intention to greet colleagues–rather than ignore them 
because I  tend to be  immersed in my own thoughts–produces 
a disposition to greet only if I  keep track of whether people 
I  encounter are indeed colleagues. Such a process of keeping 
track may be  largely or wholly unconscious. Similarly, I  can 
intend to catch the 5 o’ clock train and hence set in place a 
disposition to act that is maintained only because in the back 
of my mind I  keep track of the time. If I  completely lose 
track of the time, my disposition will disappear. Thus, in at 
least some cases, unconscious processes are required for intentions 
that function as structuring causes of our actions to actually 
result in corresponding actions.
Stage 4: Situational Anchoring
Consciously produced intentions set us up to become responsive 
to certain external or internal triggers–they program us with 
specific behavioral dispositions–but the actual triggering of actions 
itself may well be  an unconscious process. I  may be  conscious 
of the fact that I  am  hitting the break in response to a yellow 
traffic light but that does not mean that my responding is triggered, 
in a direct sense, by conscious reflection–I respond as in a self-
produced reflex. Likewise, subjects in Libet’s finger lifting experiment 
have set themselves up to become responsive to subtle, internal 
triggers after consciously processing the instructions for the 
experiment. The actual triggering itself is an unconscious process. 
It is not unlikely that very many of our daily actions have a 
similar structure: making my coffee in the morning, getting on 
my bike to go to work, starting up my computer, etc. are very 
probably all actions (or sets of actions) that are the result of a 
conscious intentions that are their structuring causes and external 
or internal unconscious cues that are their triggering causes.
The discussion of these four stages in which unconscious 
processing can play a role in consciously self-initiated actions 
is meant as nothing but a sketch of the possible unconscious 
contributions that may be  at play in consciously self-initiated 
actions. Figure 1 presents a schematic overview of the resulting 
picture of the interplay between conscious and unconscious 
processes in human volition.
Which of these influences actually occur and how will differ 
from action to action and should be  subject to empirical 
research. The idea here is merely to give a more structured 
and more detailed picture of the interplay between conscious 
and unconscious processes in human volition than is provided 
by Baumeister and Masicampo’s (2010) remark that such 
interplay is likely to play an important role in consciously 
initiated actions. The role of unconscious processes as depicted 
in Figure 1 is possibly more extensive than Baumeister and 
Masicampo intended. But, the really important thing to note 
is that despite the possibility that unconscious processes play 
a significant role in all four stages, if the process of conscious 
deliberation/complex integration meets the two requirements 
FIGURE 1 | Schematic overview of the interplay between conscious and unconscious processes in consciously self-initiated actions.
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mentioned at the beginning of this section, the ensuing action 
will still be  genuinely consciously self-initiated.
CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this article was to argue that two conceptual 
distinctions allow for a more detailed picture of the interplay 
between conscious and unconscious processes in consciously 
self-initiated action. First, I  have argued that the distinction 
between consciously formed intentions and intentions we become 
conscious of allows us to see that only the former is relevant 
to the notion of consciously self-initiated actions. This ties in 
with existing philosophical and scientific criticism of free selection 
paradigms and the suggestion that self-initiated action should 
involve deliberation and/or complex integration of diverse inputs.
Next, I  argued that consciously formed intentions as the 
initiators of actions allow for a more complex and realistic 
picture of volitional processes when we  distinguish between 
structuring and triggering causes. At least in many instances, 
consciously formed intentions are the structuring causes, rather 
than the triggering causes of our actions. This allows for the 
possibility that actions are unconsciously triggered and can 
yet count as consciously self-initiated because the triggering 
depends on there being a behavioral disposition that is 
(structurally) caused by consciously formed intentions.
Finally, I argued that just like consciously self-initiated actions 
can be  unconsciously triggered, there are three earlier stages 
in the process that starts with conscious intention formation 
and ends with acting on such an intention in which unconscious 
processing plays a role: the input stage of processes of conscious 
deliberation and/or integration; the stage of deliberation/
integration in which some processes of judging, weighing, or 
concluding many not be  conscious; and the process in which 
the behavioral disposition that is the result of a consciously 
formed intention is maintained.
It is in the nature of conceptual distinctions that we  cannot 
draw empirical conclusions from them; the resulting picture 
of the interplay of conscious and unconscious processes in 
human volition is schematic and very general. It is meant to 
function as a framework for interpreting the results of existing 
experiments and, possibly, for setting up new ones.
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